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A NEW NATIONAL INDIGENOUS 
REPRESENTATIVE BODY ... AGAIN 
by T1uJlia Anthony 
Since the abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission CATSIC') in 2004, there has been 
a void in national Indigenous representation. In 2007, 
the Australian Goverm;nent committed to establishing 
a national representative body which would build a 
partnership between Government and Indigenous people. 
In laying down the founding principles, the Government 
articulated that it will not 'create another ATSIC' or hold 
separate elections and that, while the body will have 
'urban, regional and remote representation', it 'will not 
have a service delivery role'.1 
With this Government mandate, there was an initial stage 
of consultation2 and the appointment of Tom Calma, 
then Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice . 
Commissioner, to assemble a Steering Committee for the 
creation of a national representative body. The Steering 
Committee was constituted by Indigenous people and 
ran further consultations before producing the report Our 
Future in Our Hands in August 2009.3 The report proposed 
the creation of a National Congress of Australia's First 
Peoples ('Congress'). Late last year the Government gave 
official support to Congress and committed $29.2 million 
to its establishment and early years of operation.4 
This article compires functions and governance of ATSIC 
with those proposed for Congress. It first considers the 
policy basis of self-determination that gave rise to ATSIC 
and the erosion of that policy that led to its demise. It 
then addresses the vision for Congress. The article finally 
questions whether a new Iildigenous representative 
body can have a meaningful role within the current 
Indigenous policy framework. Does the ideology of 
'building partnerships' go far enough in realising calls for 
self-determination? 
INDIGENOUS NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE 
PROMISE O F SELF-DETERMINATION 
Instruments of Indigenous governance are regarded as 
central to self-determination.5 They allow Indigenous 
people to be involved in decision making about their 
own future . This 'policy' of self-determination was first 
endorsed by the Whitlarn Government in 1972. Although 
a much more limited concept of'self-determination' than 
that set out at international law,6 the policy variously 
promoted greater Indigenous participation in Government 
decisions on Indigenous affairs, allowed a degree of 
Indigenous control over selvice delivery and supported the 
establishment ofIndigenous organisations.7 At the national 
level, under the auspices of'self-determination', successive 
Australian governments have experimented with a number 
of Indigenous representative organisations, including 
the N ational Aboriginal Consultative Committee, the 
N ational Aboriginal Conference, ATSIC and, more 
recently; the National Indigenous Council. 
Of these various bodies, ATSIC was the most broad-
reaching, straddling representative, executive, research and 
selvice delivery roles.8 Self-determination was a concept 
underpinning its creation; in 1987, then Minister for 
Aboriginal Mfairs, Gerry Hand said, 
Until all Austra lians recognise this need for self-determinat ion. 
recognise the Aborig inal and Islanders' pride and dignity as a 
people and unti l Aboriginal and Islander people can take their 
rightfu l place as ful l and equal participants in the richness and 
diversity of th is nation. our cla im s to being a civilised. mature 
and humane society sound hollow.9 
Formed in 1990 as a statutory body under the Aboriginal 
and TofffS Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ('the 
ATSIC Act'), the principle of 'self-determination' was to 
be enunciated in a preamble to the ATSIC Act. U ltimately, 
though, this proposal was defeated by the Opposition, 
which preferred the language of 'self-management' .10 
Section 3 of the ATSIC Act outlined the obj ectives of the 
new representative body, which included the formulation 
and coordination of policies affecting Indigenous people; 
the promotion of self-management; and furthering 
economic, social and cultural development. 
The constitu tion of the ATS IC Board in its final 
incarnation in 2004 comprised 16 Zone Commissioners. 
The Commissioners were elected from 35 Regional 
Councils, which were directly elected by Indigenous 
people. 11 Councilors responded to the needs of local 











































economic, social and cultural outcomes and working 
with the ATSIC Board and governments to implement 
plans. 12 The representative objectives of ATSIC were 
limited by its structure and electoral turn out. In order 
to vote, Indigenous people had to be registered on the 
electoral roll, which invariably missed a portion of the 
population. Of those registered, voter turn-out was less 
than 30%.13 Women were generally under-represented,14 
and community councils were based on electoral 
demarcations, rather than on 'boundaries traditionally 
recognised by Aboriginal people' .15 Therefore, the regional 
councilors were often representing disparate communities 
that lacked common interests or needs. 16 
Since its genesis ATSIC's capacity for self-determination 
was constrained by onerous administrative compliance 
through ongoing audits, performance evaluations, reporting 
obligations, policy changes and inadequate funding. 17 
Under s 76 of the ATSIC Act, the Office of Evaluation 
and Audit was required to monitor the Commission on a 
regular basis. It would provide quarterly audit reports to 
the Minister for Indigenous Affairs, and evaluation reports 
on every office and service program every three years. 18 
Frank Brennan described the close scrutiny of ATSIC's 
expenditure as revealing the 'underlying philosophy of the 
legislation which is accountable self-management rather 
than self-determination' .19 
The final review of ATSIC in 2003 identified a number 
of concerns with its organisation.20 It recommended 
greater regional control of policy and service delivery, 
public declarations of conflicts of interest, additional 
performance evaluation by the Productivity Commission, 
protocols covering working relationships for the elected 
and administrative arms, and governance training for 
board members.21 
While the report did not recommend the abolition of 
ATSIC, in early 2004 the Federal Government announced 
that the body would be another casualty of the emergent 
Indigenous policy of 'practical reconciliation'.22 The 
decision to disbandATSIC was followed through with bi-
partisan support. There was no consultation with ATSIC 
or" Indigenous communities. The Prime Minister and 
Opposition Leader justified the abolition by reference to 
the 'failure' of self-detennination.23 
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AUSTRALIA'S FIRST 
structure to fill the void left 'behind. In this pursuit, it 
has emphasised building partnerships and achieving 
equality.24 Consistent with its pre-election approach, 
self-determination does not feature prominently in 
the Government's language. Instead, it is intended that 
Indigenous Australians will be 'involved in developing 
policies and programs to improve their lives' aild that 
their views will be 'represented to Government through 
credible mechanisms'. 25 
Notwithstanding the Government's reticence, the 
Steering Committee set for itself self-detennination a.s 
a foremost guiding principle in developing the blueprint 
for Congress. In its report, the Steering Committee states 
that a new representative body is critical to ,proyiding 'a 
nationa) voice' that will 'enable the goals, aspirations, 
interests and values of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander peoples to be heard in national debate' .26 It will 
also have an essential r.ole in advocating rights, including 
'our right to determine our political status and pursue our 
economic, social and cultural development'. 27 Importantly, 
though, Congress has been designed as a purely advisory 
body; it will have no direct role in developing policy or 
implementing services. 
COMPOSITION 
Congress has been designed in a way that will engage 
existing Indigenous organisations and community groups, 
as well as meritorious Indigenous individuals. This will 
prevent duplication of existing Indigenous bodies, which 
was identified as a problem with ATSIC.28 At the same 
time, it will present new pressures to already under-funded 
Indigenous organisations. 
There are a number of layers of the Congress. Firstly, 
the Steering Committee has selected an Ethics Council 
comprised ofIndigenous people 'who are widely recognised 
for their integrity' .29 The Ethics Council will develop and 
monitor Congress' ethical standards.30 Congress will be 
divided into three chambers comprised of 12'8 delegates: 
. the Representative Bodies Chamber (40 delegates), the 
Sectoral Chamber (40 delegates) and a chamber comprised 
of respected members of the Indigenous community (40 
delegates). In addition, based on a shortlist prepared by 
the Ethics Council, the National Executive has now been 
elected.31 Each layer of the organisation will be subject to 
a gender-balance requirement. 
PEOPLES CHAMBER 1 
While the Labor Opposition regarded ATSIC as a failed This will draw on Indigenous representative bodies at 
experiment, the incumbent Federal Government has national, state and territory and local levels. Members 
sought to establish another Indigenous representative will be selected based on strict criteria, including 
evidence of their community representation and political The Government has already confirmed that it will not be 
independence.32 There will be a maximum of two delegates supporting a future fund42 and has encouraged the body 
per organisation. These bodies constitute members who to source funds from 'other sectors'.43 The Minister for 
are mostly 'elected, or in lesser numbers, appointed by a Indigenous Affairs,Jenny Macklin, has stated that funding 
Minister or Government'. 33 for the Congress will be 
CHAMBER 2 
This will consist of 'sectoral peak bodies and experts', 
including Indigenous researchers and experts.34 Examples 
include land councils, prescribed b?dies corporate and 
native title representative bodies, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander legal services, the Indigenous Disability 
Network and Stolen Generations organisations.35 
CHAMBER 3 
The Ethics Council will be responsible for the appointment 
of 40 Indigenous delegates based on merit and according to 
a set of criteria. Applications will be sought every two years. 
Only individuals from groups who are not represented in 
the two chambers will be able to apply 
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE 
The National Executive of six part-time members 
and two full-time Co-Chairs was announced in May 
this year. 36 Each member will have a term of four 
years. The National Executive will lead the three 
Chambers and will be responsible for formulating, 
advocating for and implementing priorities consistent 
with the decisions taken at Congress meetings. It will 
develop strategic and business plans, organise and lead 
engagement with Indigenous communities, direct 
the work of the a~ministrative and executive support 
team and communicate the views and policies of the 
organisation to stakeholders and the Australia~ publicY 
FUNDING 
Our Future in OUf Hands identifies the need for government 
funding as well as economic independence to ensure 
'substantial operational autonomy'.38 The report sets out 
a number of strategies to achieve this. First, Congress will 
not be established as a government body or department. 
Instead, it will be separately established as a corporation,39 
making it suitable for fund raising and less vulnerable 
to policy whims.40 Second, the report proposes that, for 
the first ten years, the Federal Government will provide 
recurrent (untied) funding support and a $200 million 
Investment Future Fund.41 Mter the initial five year period, 
it is envisaged that Congress will begin to operate off its 
investment income, as well as other independent funding 
sources, rather than remaining entirely dependent on 
Commonwealth support. 
, 
administered in the same way as it is for other national peak 
bodies, respecting the right of organisations to put their 
view, while requiring them to demonstrate that they are 
representative and that funding is used responsibly.44 
In the absence of a capital fund, financial autonomywil1 be 
unviable. This was one of the keystones of the new model, 
put forward by the Steering Committee to distinguish 
Congress from ATSIC. This limitation will not only 
maintain its dependence on Government, but also limit 
the body's scope to initiate new projects, research and 
consultations. One of the most forthcoming criticisms of 
ATSIC was that it lacked 'certainty of access to resources' 
which Indigenous people controlled.45 So, notwithstanding 
the development of an extra-governmental corporate 
structure, the question of financial dependence means that 
Congress will once again be pron~ to budget cuts where 
it voices opposition to government policy.46 
CONCLUSION 
Our Future in OUf Hands responds to a need arising from 
the absence of a national Indigenous representative body 
since the demise of ATSIC. In its absence, bi-partisan 
Indigenous policy has been able to develop without 
Indigenous input. The Steering Committee sought 
to overcome some of the shortcomings of the ATSIC 
structure - in particular its lack of engagement with local 
organisations - through the representative and sectoral 
chambers. However, unlike previous representative 
bodies, whose membership was determined by democratic 
elections, Congress delegates will be partly appointed. 
With respect to the election of the National Executive, 
only those Indigenous people who successfully apply 
to be members of Congress can vote at Annual General 
Meetings. Moreover, the National Executive was drawn 
from a shortlist compiled by the Ethics Council. In these 
respects, there are questions about how 'representative' 
this new body will be at the local and community levels. 
Moreover, one of its benchmarks for success - financial 
autonomy - has already become untenable. This not 
only puts Congress on shaky ground but calls into 
question the nature of the GoveI11ll1ent's commitment to 
'building partnerships' with Indigenous people. It reveals 
'partnerships' to be something quite different from the 
principle of self-detennination. The failure to advert to the 
central pillar offinancial autonomy furthers the constraints 
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imposed on the new body from the outset, that is, the lack 
of power to deliver services, to implement policy, or to 
conduct separate elections. These practical limitations are 
in many ways a step backwards, reinforcing the idea that 
Indigenous people are unable to govern themselves unless 
they are subject to strict criteria and supervision. 
Ultimately, the success of Congress will depend on its 
capacity to attain legitimacy and support from Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people across Australia.47 Tom 
Calma has made it clear that the model set out in Our 
Future in Our Hands was 'determined and controlled by 
Indigenous people'.48 However, if this is to continue into 
the next phase of national representation, the Government 
will have to move beyond its uneven construction of 
'partnership' towards ~elf-determination. 
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